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This article analyzes the law dissemination campaign (pufa huodong) that China has implemented 
for almost three decades, and sheds light on recent development of the rule of law policy in China. It 
first examines the background of the campaign. Then, the article delves into the process of the 
campaign as well as the legal knowledge education of leading cadres as a case study. Third, it takes 
stock of the campaign’s achievements and limitations. This article suggests that the campaign has 
played a vital role in encouraging ordinary people’s legal practices. Furthermore, it argues that the 
campaign provided important experience by which China set the rule of law policy as a guiding 
principle of government at the 15th Party Congress in October 1997 and more recently the Fourth 
Plenum of 18th Central Committee of the CCP in October 2014.  
 





The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided “governing the country according to the 
law” (yifa zhiguo) as an official guiding principle of government at the 15
th
 Party Congress in 
1997. Thereafter, the Party and state organs have formulated policies in order to implement 
the principle. The State Council, for example, has executed “administration according to the 
law” (yifa xingzheng) by promulgating the Decision on the Comprehensive Implementation 
of Administration according to the Law in 1999 while the CCP has implemented “ruling the 
country according to the law” (yifa zhizheng) since the 16
th
 Party Congress in 2002. Likewise, 
the Supreme People’s Court has initiated judicial reform with the goals of judicial fairness 
and effectiveness by enacting the Outline on the Reform of the People’s Courts in the Next 
Five Years in 1999. In this way, the law became an important tool of the CCP to rule the 
country.  
On the other hand, the law has also played an important role in Chinese society since the 
1990s in relation to addressing social disputes. Notably the rights consciousness or “rule 
consciousness” of ordinary people based on legal awareness has been enhanced as Lianjiang 
Li and Elizabeth Perry suggested (Li, 2010: 47-68; Perry, 2008: 37-50; Perry, 2009: 17-20). 
At the same time, as a result of these changes, legal practice usage initiated by Chinese 
citizens have also rapidly increased, as illustrated by various court cases and legal action by 
workers in urban areas (Lee, 2007; Lee, 2010: 57-79; Gallagher, 2006: 783-816; Gallagher, 
2007: 196-227; Gallagher, 2011: 204-233; Chen, 2004: 27-45). In a word, the law became a 
vital tool of ordinary people to further their legitimate rights and interests. 
How has the law been able to become both an instrument of the CCP to govern the 
country and a weapon of Chinese citizens to defend their rights in the 1990s? In other words, 
first, how did the CCP decide the rule of law policy as a new ruling principle in 1997? 
Second, what factors facilitated the increases of ordinary people’s legal practises? In 
addressing these questions, some studies emphasize the transformation of socioeconomic 
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conditions, and the changes of popular consciousness and their behaviours (Shi, 1997; Shi, 
1999; Tang, 2005). Others pay more attention to the state's efforts. For example, Mary E. 
Gallagher argues that Chinese workers have advisedly used the law to protect their legitimate 
rights and interests due mainly to the state’s encouragement (Gallagher, 2005: 55-83). 
Hualing Fu and Richard Cullen similarly argue that the state has encouraged ordinary people 
to acquire legal knowledge by way of a legal enlightenment campaign (Fu and Cullen, 2008: 
111-127). But these studies, except for Mechthild Exner, have not analyzed the state’s 
attempts in depth (Exner, 1995: 68-102).  
This article focuses on the law dissemination campaign (pufa huodong/hereafter LDC) to 
investigate the two questions. This is because, in my view, the LDC has close relations to 
both the rule of law policy initiated by the Party and the increase of legal action exercised by 
Chinese people. After the first five-year campaign from 1986 to 1990, China decided to 
continue it: the second and third five-year campaigns followed in the 1990s, and the fourth 
and fifth campaigns in the 2000s. The sixth campaign began in April 2011. The very fact that 
China has incessantly carried out legal enlightenment campaigns as an important national 
policy for almost three decades strongly indicates that it has played a certain role in enabling 
the CCP to adopt the rule of law policy as a new guiding principle of government, and in 
intensifying the legal practices of Chinese citizens. 
To this end, first, this article examines the background of the LDC−that is, why did China 
launch the campaign at both central and local levels? Then it delves into the implementing 
method of the campaign and the process of legal knowledge education of “leading cadres” as 
a case study, because leading cadres have been designated as the “core” (hexin) target of the 
campaign from the start. Third, it analyzes the campaign’s consequences including both 
positive achievements and critical limitations. The final section of the article summarizes this 
study’s findings.   
This study relies on a wide range of source materials, including both extant literature and 
interview documents that I collected in China. The materials include official documents 
released by the Party and governments, speeches and articles of higher-level leaders and 
officials, implementation and situational reports of local governments, and survey data and 
field reports by Chinese governments and non-governmental institutes. To compensate for 
materials, I interviewed with government officials and senior staff members of social 
organizations in Shanghai and Guangdong in the mid-2000s.    
 
 
2. WHY DID CHINA START THE LAW DISSEMINATION CAMPAIGN? 
 
According to its plans, the campaign had two purposes. The primary purpose was the 
dissemination of legal knowledge. According to the LDC’s first five-year (1986-1990) plan, 
the campaign aimed to popularize “ten laws” (including the Constitution, Criminal Law, 
Criminal Procedural Law, Civil Procedural Law, and Marriage Law) and “one rule” (i.e., the 
Punishment Rule of the Maintenance of Public Order). The second purpose was the 
enlargement of legal practices. By adding it to the Second five-year (1991-95) plan, the 
campaign went beyond legal enlightenment with the goal of increasing public's legal 
knowledge, and instead started to become a political reform policy that shifted the mode of 
national governance from the rule of person to the rule of law (Sifabu, 2001a: 35-37, 46-48).  
 
 





2.1 Establishing a Workable Legal System 
 
Viewed from the central level, it started as a policy to establish a socialist legal system 
which China has officially pursued since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the CCP in December 1978. The CCP implemented the policy while dealing 
with the remaining socio-political chaos of the Cultural Revolution and restoring political 
stability. The decade of turmoil made political leaders feel keenly aware of the necessity and 
significance of a functioning legal system. They concluded that the rule of person was the 
main cause of the socio-political chaos in the Cultural Revolution (Cheng, 1999: 3-4; 
Renmin Daibiao, 2004: 73). With this consideration in mind, reformers in the CCP proposed 
the task of promoting a socialist democracy and perfecting the legal system, along with the 
reform and opening-up policies. That is, the CCP expected that establishing a legal system 
would secure social stability and consolidate social unity, and thereby guarantee long-term 
socio-political stability within which the Party could pursue the reform and opening-up 
policies without losing its monopoly on political power (Diamant, Lubman and O’Brien, 
2005: 3, 7; Gallagher, 2005: 74-77). 
The LDC in the 1980s was promoted as a vital step towards a functioning legal system. 
Enacting the law and restoring relevant state organs were not enough to establish a legal 
system and to make a habit of working in accordance with the law. To this end, more 
thorough reform was necessary that could profoundly transform the consciousness and 
practice of party cadres and state officials. Put differently, establishing and implementing a 
legal system on a national scale was possible only when party-state cadres, especially leading 
cadres, with a higher level of legal knowledge and consciousness, were willing to govern 
according to the law.  
Upon reaching this judgement, the CCP decided to launch a large-scale political 
campaign to disseminate legal knowledge based on the previous local experiments and to 
change the mode of governing the country. And for this reason, the party designated leading 
cadres as a “core” target group of the campaign. In this sense, the LDC developed from legal 
enlightenment campaign into a political reform, in order to stimulate legal knowledge 
education for leading cadres, and thereby to elevate their law-abiding attitude and to realize 
legal practice at the local and basic levels. 
 
2.2. Maintaining Public Order and Protecting Popular Rights 
 
Viewed from the local and basic levels, the campaign started as a countermeasure to deal 
with the unravelling of governance systems and the deteriorating public order at the local and 
basic levels in the early 1980s. Especially, the campaign was considered to be an effective 
measure that farmers and workers could employ to cope with the misbehaviour of party-state 
cadres and to protect their legitimate rights and interests. 
With the dissolution of collective systems in rural areas in the early 1980s, China 
confronted urgent tasks: dealing with deteriorating public order and the collapse of its social 
governance systems. These resulted in a rapid increase in crime under the difficult economic 
conditions of the early reform era. Therefore, the party and the government made utmost 
efforts to maintain public order by launching mopping-up operations against crime (yanta) 
and to establish new governance systems at local and basic levels. The LDC started as an 
effective measure to cope with these problems. This is similar to the emergence of villagers’ 
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committees in the countryside in the 1980s: they were voluntarily conceived to tackle the 
decline of former social governance systems in a few localities and became widespread over 
time under the guidance and support of some party leaders and government officials. 
For example, at the National Work Conference on the Propagation and Education of the 
Legal System in June 1985, when it was officially decided to launch the campaign, the 
Minister of Justice, Zou Yu, argued that the campaign should be implemented to deal with 
deteriorating public order (Sifabu, 2001b: 1049-1055). In a similar vein, at the Second 
National Conference on the Propagation and Education of the Legal System in 1986, then the 
Chairman of Central Political-Legal Affairs Committee, Qiao Shi, also insisted that the 
campaign was a significant measure to resolve the deteriorating social public order. In his 
view, if citizens worked and regulated their actions and protected their rights and interests in 
accordance with the law, crimes would be prevented and decreased (Sifabu, 2001b: 1039-
1040). 
Furthermore, the LDC was also implemented as a measure to control the misbehaviour of 
local- and basic-level cadres and to protect ordinary people’s legitimate rights and interests. 
The slogan of “use the law as a weapon” (yong falü wuqi) neatly captures this intention. For 
instance, at the same National Work Conference on the Legal System in June 1985, then the 
head of Central Propaganda Department, Deng Liqun, argued that the campaign should 
provide “one billion people with the law” so that “the law becomes a weapon in the hands of 
the people.” Then people, by using the law, would fight against social crimes, especially 
political corruption and the encroachment of public rights, in order to protect their legitimate 
rights and interests (Sifabu, 2001b: 1040-1045). The slogan of “use the law as a weapon” 
was also inserted into the first and the third five-year plans in an indirect but explicit fashion 
(Sifabu, 2001a: 35, 36, 46-48). In this way, the LDC was promoted with the intention of 
presenting Chinese citizens with the legal means of fighting social crimes and cadres’ 
infringement of public rights. 
 
 
3. HOW DID CHINA IMPLEMENT THE LAW DISSEMINATION CAMPAIGN? 
 
The most important principle of implementing the LDC was an incremental and flexible 
application of the central plans to specific regions and agencies depending on their specific 
conditions. This principle was especially pertinent to rural areas where subjective and 
objective conditions for implementing the campaign were not well prepared. For instance, at 
the Second National Conference on the Propagation and Education of Legal System in 1986, 
the former Minister of Justice, Zou Yu, emphasized that “we should start from the realities 
clinging to the attitude of seeking truth from facts (shishi qiushi)” in the processes of 
evolving the campaign in rural areas. In other words, “the law dissemination activities should 
not apply one model and should not impose uniformity on all cases (yidaoqie).” In his view, 
if the campaign was implemented hastily in the absence of appropriate conditions, the 
campaign would be carried out pro forma (Sifabu, 2001b: 1059-1067). 
This principle of incremental and flexible implementation has had a significant effect on 
the evolution of the campaign. That is, the principle has precipitated huge disparities between 
regions and agencies in terms of the campaign’s speed and depth. For example, in one region, 
the party secretary, as a chief of a leading small group of law dissemination (pufa lingdao 
xiaozu), actively promoted the LDC as a significant party work; the secretary mobilized 
support and participation from all government agencies and organizations. In another region, 




the vice-head of the political-legal affairs committee or the bureau chief of justice headed the 
leading small group, and the campaign was regarded as marginal. Even some regions, using 
the excuse of the principle, treated the campaign just as a formal necessity and even did not 
start it at all.  
The campaign has employed two methods of legal knowledge education targeted at 
different groups. The first method is face-to-face education. This refers to crash courses or 
short-term training classes in legal knowledge prepared by party schools and administrative 
training centers, in which trainees study law and legal systems intensively. The face-to-face 
education method chiefly applies to party-state cadres, SOE managers, and students. In 
addition, citizens residing in metropolitan cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, often attend 
law seminars, lectures and classes. According to a survey of Shanghai citizens in 2005, 59.9 
percent of respondents attended the seminars, lectures and courses in legal knowledge 
prepared by party-state organs, social organizations, SOEs and resident communities during 
the campaign (Yin, 2005: 67-74). This means that legal knowledge education has been 
widely promoted at least in big cities such as Shanghai and Beijing. 
The second method is indirect education and propagation by use of mass media, 
especially televisions and newspapers. This method applies to ordinary people such as 
residents in rural areas and small cities. For example, in the fourth five-year (2001-05) 
campaign, the Ministry of Justice, General Bureau of Broadcasting and Television, and other 
relevant central agencies, issued the Opinion on Strengthening Television’s Works of 
Propagation and Education in the Legal System, and requested all pertinent agencies to 
implement the regulation. Thereafter, about 300 provincial- and municipal-level television 
stations started to make and release legal knowledge programs. Among them, 20 stations 
televised legal knowledge programs every day, and five stations opened new specialized 
channels for broadcasting. In addition, the National Office of Law Dissemination (i.e, a 
central ad-hoc coordinating organ for the LDC established in 1991) and Legal Daily jointly 
made television programs under the title of rule of law broadcasting; more than 50 stations 
nationwide released the programs simultaneously. This was further enlarged in the fifth five-
year (2006-10) campaign period, so that about 430 provincial- and city-level stations and 
some 1,530 county-level stations provided regular broadcasts of legal knowledge programs 
(Zhang, 2004; Wu, 2011). 
Finally, leading small groups and their administrative offices have led the campaign. The 
Minister of Justice is the director of the National Office of Law Dissemination with support 
of deputy ministers of Justice Ministry and deputy heads of Propaganda Department as 
deputy directors. In localities, there are also leading small groups of law dissemination and 
their offices at all levels. Regions differ in who holds the leading posts of the small groups, 
as mentioned above. LDC offices are generally led by the heads of justice bureaus in local 
governments with the staffers dispatched from party and government agencies. This form of 
leadership and executive staffers applies to all social organizations and SOEs as well as party 
and government agencies from the central to basic levels. 
 
 
4. A CASE OF THE CAMPAIGN: LEGAL KNOWLEDGE EDUCATION FOR LEADING 
CADRES 
 
As mentioned above, leading cadres have been the “core” target group of the LDC. For 
this reason, we will analyze legal knowledge education for leading cadres as a case study to 
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understand how the campaign has been implemented. The CCP has tried to educate higher 
cadres about the law after the principle of the legalization of party leadership was established 
in 1982 as part of the new Party Constitution (Hou et al., 2004: 339-341). This principle 
means that the Party should wield its leadership within legal boundaries according to due 
legal procedures. These efforts accelerated with the launch of the first five-year campaign in 
1986. 
The CCP’s top leaders took the initiative in conducting the legal knowledge education for 
high-level cadres. For instance, Hu Yaobang, then the General Secretary of the CCP, 
convened the first law seminar for the highest-level cadres in 1985, and he stressed the 
significance of legal knowledge study and legal practices for senior leaders. In 1986, Hu 
convened three more law seminars, which were attended by high-level leaders such as Qiao 
Shi, Li Peng, Tian Jiyun and Hu Qiaomu. At the same time, the Party Center organized “law 
study small groups of leading cadres” composed of higher cadres above division level (chuji), 
and these cadres began to study legal knowledge on a regular basis (Sifabu, 2001b: 1589-
1596). These practices resulted in “collective study sessions” on the law that the CCP 
Politburo has convened regularly since 1994. According to a report, the Politburo held law 
study sessions 20 times in total for 12 years between December 1994 and March 2007. It 
means that the Politburo regularly held the law study meetings once or twice each year 
(Zhongyang, 2006). 
In addition, the CCP instructed all party schools, cadre schools and administrative 
schools to include the study of the law in their curriculum in order to strengthen legal 
knowledge education for higher-level cadres and government officials. This was partially 
practised in the first five-year LDC and disseminated nationally with the start of the second 
campaign. Specifically, in August 1985, the Central Party School convened the National 
Conference on the Courses of Legal System where it requested all party schools to open legal 
knowledge courses as a requirement for trainees (Sifabu, 2001b: 1059-1067). As a 
consequence, the study of the law became a required course of party schools, cadre schools, 
and administrative schools. 
At present, the Central Party School has “Three Basics” and “Five Contemporaries” as 
required courses. The Three Basics refers to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong’s Thoughts, 
and Deng Xiaoping’s Theory, while the Five Contemporaries refers to the contemporary 
world economy, world science and technology, world law and establishing a Chinese legal 
system, world military and Chinese military construction (i.e., “modernization”), and world 
ideational trends. This arrangement illustrates that higher cadres are required to take a legal 
knowledge course when they study at the Central Party School (Wibowo and Fook, 2008: 
139-156; Shambaugh, 2008: 143-148). 
This policy has continued until recent years. For instance, the Central Organization 
Department, Propaganda Department, Political-Legal Affairs Committee and the Ministry of 
Education jointly issued the Notice on Studying A Reader of Socialist Rule of the Law Ideas 
in September 2009. The Notice ordered that studying socialist rule of law ideas be included 
in leading cadres’ study sessions and party schools’ curriculum. It also required that higher 
cadres should correctly understand and put into practice a socialist rule of law in terms of its 
theoretical aspects as well as individual laws and institutions (Zhonggong zhongyang, 2009: 
1-5). 
Legal knowledge education for leading cadres has been widely implemented in localities 
as well. The Guangzhou City of Guangdong Province is a case in point. According to a 
report on this matter, Guangzhou established a legal knowledge education system for leading  
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cadres above the vice-bureau chief level (fujuji) in 1993. First, the Law Dissemination Office 
of the city assumed responsibility for running the study sessions, and study of the law was 
made a compulsory subject of leading cadres’ study lists so that cadres had to study the law 
in their regular meetings. Furthermore, all leading cadres had to attend intensive training 
courses on the law for at least three full days each year. In all, 25 classes were held for four 
years from 1994 to 1997, and more than 3,700 leading cadres in total enrolled in the classes 
(Sifabu, 2001b: 2000-2002). 
We can see how widely the legal knowledge education for leading cadres was 
implemented in Guangzhou by examining the results of a survey conducted in 2005. Table 1 
shows that there was a clear difference between groups in relation to how they acquired legal 
knowledge. First, “Broadcasts” was the most important channel through which all groups 
except for state organ workers and students acquired legal knowledge. Notably, the rate of 
“Broadcasts” for farmers (i.e., 38.0 percent) was much higher than any other group, and this 
means that propagation by television and radio was a main method to disseminate legal 
knowledge to farmers. And it is natural that “School education” marked the highest rate (i.e., 
47.8 percent) in the case of students. 
State organ workers (i.e., cadres and officials), however, were distinguishable from other 
groups in that “Study sessions of the campaign” (30.5 percent) was the most important 
channel through which they acquired legal knowledge. In addition, the rates for business unit 
workers and SOE workers, 24.2 percent and 25.5 percent respectively, were much higher 
than those of other groups (all below 15 percent). This means that relatively intensive study 
sessions have evolved for workers of state organs, business units and SOEs during the 
campaign. This survey result confirms that the designation of “core” target groups in the 
campaign was actually implemented on the ground, even though we are wondering how 
much it actually changed the mind and behaviours of party cadres. 
Furthermore, local regulations have gradually institutionalized law study sessions for 
leading cadres. According to a 2009 report by the National Office of Law Dissemination, 16 
provincial-level local people’s congresses promulgated regulations which make it 
compulsory for state officials to study the law and to take examinations in order to evaluate 
their level of legal knowledge. That is, local rules stipulate that higher officials, who should 
receive approval or appointment from local people's congresses, must take legal knowledge 
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examinations before submitting personnel bills, and those who do not pass the tests should 
not be approved or appointed (Quanguo Pufa, 2009: 33-38). Likewise, according to a 2004 
report by the Minister of Justice, 12 provincial-level administrative units founded such 
institutions as “certificates of law dissemination” and “examination and evaluation of legal 
knowledge study,” by which they regularly checked the legal knowledge study of higher 
officials and reflected the results of examinations in the consideration of cadres’ career 
promotion (Zhang, 2004). 
Hebei Province is a representative case. The Provincial People’s Congress enacted the 
Work Regulation on the Propagation and Education of the Legal System in Hebei Province 
in December 1995. This regulation included several measures such as the main duties of the 
propagation and education of the legal system, and legal knowledge study and its evaluation 
for officials at various levels. Among them, the most important thing is the evaluation system 
for officials regarding their legal knowledge study and practices. According to this regulation, 
“personnel agencies should include a legal knowledge test as a part of employment 
examination for recruiting officials, and those who fail to pass the test must not be 
appointed.” In addition, “state organs exercising authority to appoint and dismiss officials 
(i.e., people’s congresses) should regularly conduct the examination of legal knowledge and 
inspect the performance of law enforcement of officials, and those who fail to pass the 
examination and inspection should not be promoted. State officials holding leading posts 
should be dismissed if they fail to pass the inspection twice consecutively” (Sifabu, 2001b: 
927-928). 
A caveat is in order here: there is a huge difference between regions in terms of the 
effectiveness of law study sessions. Zhejiang Province is a case in point where law study 
sessions have not been seriously organized due to the lack of support from the local party 
leadership. According to a report in 2007, the province’s Office of Law Dissemination 
proposed to evaluate leading cadres’ legal knowledge study, in which the results of their 
legal knowledge examination and of law-enforcement inspection were to be taken into 
account in their career promotion. But the Provincial Party Committee rejected the plan after 
deliberation. Consequently, some leading cadres occasionally sent proxies to take legal 
knowledge tests in their stead, and submitted reports on their legal study written by other 
persons. Furthermore, absentees and disqualified cadres of legal knowledge tests were not 
seriously punished because of the absence of relevant regulations. In short, Zhejiang’s law 
study sessions lost authority among higher cadres (Zhongguo Fazhi, 2007: 221-240). 
 
 
5. POSITIVE OUTCOMES OF THE LAW DISSEMINATION CAMPAIGN 
 
The LDC has had several explicit and implicit consequences. Among them, the 
establishment and extension of legal-aid systems and the increased use of legal action by 
citizens are most notable.  
 
5.1 Facilitating the Establishment of Legal Aid Systems 
 
The LDC has performed a vital role in establishing and spreading legal aid systems, 
which had not existed before in China. As the campaign stressed from the beginning, it is 
indispensible to establish and disseminate easily-accessible legal aid systems so that ordinary 
citizens can protect their legitimate rights and interests by using the law as a weapon. In 




particular, the CCP has emphasized the importance of educating people about the 
Constitution in the process of the campaign, and the Constitution itself clearly stipulates that 
“all persons are equal before the law.” To realize this principle, the state should make legal 
aid available to Chinese citizens (Sifabu Falü, 1998). 
The term “legal aid” (falü yuanzhu) was almost unknown in China before the Director of 
the National Office of Law Dissemination and Minister of Justice, Xiao Yang, argued that 
“China should establish a legal aid system with Chinese characteristics” in the process of the 
second five-year (1991-95) LDC (Sifabu Falü, 1998). Xiao raised this matter privately in late 
1993 and officially in January 1994 when he considered the draft of the Lawyer Law. After 
he asked how legal aid systems should be established, officials in the Ministry started to 
widely discuss the issue with local legal officials. 
In an attempt to realize Xiao’s instruction to establish legal aid systems, several “trial 
points” (shidian) were experimented within designated regions including Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou. As a result, the Guangzhou City Legal Aid Center, China’s first state legal 
aid agency, was founded in November 1995. For reference, a few social organizations and 
individuals established legal aid agencies earlier than the state. For example, the Guangdong 
Women’s Federation founded the Guangdong Provincial Women and Children’s Legal 
Office in 1993.
1
 Also with the promulgation of several related laws, such as the Criminal 
Procedural Law and Lawyer Law, the legal grounds for establishing legal aid systems were 
laid. Based on these efforts, the Ministry of Justice announced in 1996 that legal aid systems 
would be established across China (Funü Falü, 1997: 78-84, 95-103). In this way, China 
became the only socialist country where the state took the initiative in establishing legal aid 
systems on a nationwide scale (Liebman, 1999: 211-286). 
 


















Source: Zhongguo falü yuanzhu wang (China’s Legal Aid Network), http://www.chinalegalaid.gov.cn 
(accessed August 10, 2011).   
                                                          
1  Interviews with senior leaders of the Federation, August 10, 2004 and February 22, 2006 in 
Guangzhou. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the development of state-operated legal aid systems since 1999. The 
number of agencies increased quickly, from 1,235 in 1999 to 3,573 in 2010. The number of 
staff members also increased in a similarly fast fashion: it increased three and a half times for 
the same period, from 3,920 in 1999 to 13,830 in 2010. Lastly, cases that the agencies treated 
increased 5.3 times over 10 years, from about 120,000 cases in 1999 to 640,000 cases in 
2009. By way of reference, these figures cover just the state agencies, and if we include all 
legal aid organizations run by social associations and individuals, the total number would be 
much larger. By one estimate, there were about 5,000 legal aid organizations of all sorts in 
1999 (Funü Falü, 1997: 78-84, 95-103). 
Due to the rapid expansion of legal aid systems since the 1990s, Chinese citizens have 
been able to take part in legal action such as litigation and arbitration as we will discuss 
below. In other words, if the state did not try to establish legal aid systems nationwide, the 
public could not easily participate in legal action. This is because legal action calls for both 
expertise in the law and also substantial financial resources to employ legal experts. 
Conversely, if the state did not propagandize the slogan of “use the law as a weapon” and 
encourage citizens to use the law on a huge scale in the process of the LDC, the people 
would not widely and properly use legal aid systems. As Mary E. Gallagher, and Hualing Fu 
and Richard Cullen argue, urban workers have been able to acquire legal knowledge relating 
to labor rights in the process of the LDC and have used the law actively because they 
seriously believed in the slogan (Gallagher, 2005; Fu and Cullen, 2008: 111-127). 
 
5.2 The Increase of Rights Protecting Activities by Using the Law as a Weapon 
 
After the start of the LDC, an increasing number of Chinese citizens has attempted to 
resolve disputes by using the law, and consequently legal action has become an important 
mode of addressing disputes. For instance, according to Yongshun Cai, legal action became 
the second-most significant channel (27 percent) only after the letters and visits system 
(xinfang: 40.2 percent) in 2005, through which Chinese citizens aired their complaints. This 
indicates that taking legal action to deal with disputes has become a universal mode of action  
   














Source: Zhu Jingwen. ed. 2007. Zhongguo falü fazhan baogao: Shujuku yu zhibiao tixi (A report on 
China’s Legal Development: Data and Index System). Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin daxue 
chubanshe.  




for Chinese citizens in the 2000s (Cai, 2010). David Zweig confirms this fact (Zweig, 2010: 
123-147). 
The rapid increase in lawsuits since the mid-1980s illustrates this new trend in Chinese 
people’s legal action. As Figure 2 notes, lawsuits increased some ten times from a half 
million cases in 1979 to five million cases in 2004 (an annual rate of increase of 10.2 
percent). The rapid increase in cases started in the mid-1980s, when the first five-year 
campaign was launched. That is, the total number of court cases recorded over two millions 
in 1986 for the first time and since then it increased rapidly. Two factors brought about the 
swift increase in court cases. First, with the extension of public legal knowledge and the 
elevation of legal consciousness as a result of the LDC, people’s desire to protect their rights 
and interests by using the law has increased. Second, the state has exhorted Chinese citizens 
to resolve social disputes by using legal channels instead of unconventional measures such as 
demonstrations and riots, and the result has been an increase in court cases (Liebman, 2005: 
1-157). That is, as Pierre Landy shows, one of the most significant causes of the rapid 
increase in court cases is the CCP’s efforts to disseminate legal knowledge and encourage 
people to use them (Landy, 2008: 207-234). In brief, above-mentioned two factors are the 
results of the LDC. 
The increasing mobilization of the law in popular resistance and the intellectual 
movement in the 1990s is also closely related with the campaign: that is, the LDC played an 
important role in disseminating legal knowledge among Chinese citizens and encouraging 
them to use the law under the slogan of “use the law as a weapon.” This includes farmers’ 
protests known as “rightful resistance,” in which rural protesters skilfully use laws and 
central policies (O’Brien and Li, 2005: 31-53; O'Brien and Li, 2006; O’Brien and Li, 2008: 
1-23; Tang, 2005: 24-49), workers’ increasing use of the law as a weapon (Lee, 2007; Lee, 
2010: 57-79; Gallagher, 2006: 783-816; Gallagher, 2007: 196-227), increasing legal-based 
women’s movements (Lee and Regan, 2009: 541-565; Funü Falü, 2002: 266-268), the rights-
protecting activities of lawyers (Michelson, 2006: 1-38; Young, 2005: 1133-1149; Pils, 
2007: 1209-1287), and intellectuals’ dissident movements (Pei, 2010: 31-56) and environ-
mental movements based on the law (Yang, 2005: 46-66). 
Social organizations, for example, have taken legal action to further their members’ rights 
and interests after the start of the LDC (Cho, 2009: 113-142). All social organizations have 
taken the new principle seriously, and strived to further their rights and interests by use of the 
law. But their “use the law as a weapon” is different, depending on their political status and 
their actual capabilities to undertake effective works, including budget and organizational 
strength. Viewed in this perspective, social organizations that have relatively close relations 
with the CCP and governments and cooperate with them can be divided into two categories.
2
 
The first category includes trade unions and women’s federations, which enjoy 
comparatively higher political status with strong organizational capacity. They can 
participate in various legal practices promoted by the state. In particular, they have promoted 
three policies in relation to legal action. One is to take part in the lawmaking process in order 
to “protect their rights and interests from the origin” (yuantou weiquan) by suggesting 
legislative agendas, drafting regulations alone or jointly, and attending legislative hearings. 
Another is to conduct oversight with government agencies and legislative committees to 
                                                          
2 Interviews with senior leaders of trade unions, women’s federations, the federations of industry and 
commerce, and consumers’ associations in Shanghai and Guangdong: February 13, 17 and 18, 2004 in 
Shanghai; August 10, 11, 13 and 17, 2004, and February 14, 16, 21 and 22, 2006 in Guangzhou. 
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check how laws are implemented and to resolve related problems. Trade unions take part in 
supervisory activities when government agencies and legislative committees oversee labor-
related laws such as the Trade Union Law and Labor Contract Law. Similarly women’s 
federations attend when they supervise women- and youths-related laws, such as the Youth 
Rights Protection Law and Women Rights Protection Law. Still another is legal aid for 
affiliated members. They have their own legal aid centers in which full-time lawyers and 
staffers provide legal services to their members. 
The second category includes social organizations such as consumers’ associations, the 
federations of industry and commerce, and communist youth leagues. Because they have a 
relatively lower political status and generally lack the capacity to undertake serious work 
compared to the previously-mentioned organizations, they cannot take part in, or do not have 
enough authority to ask to join, the lawmaking and supervisory activities of the government 
agencies and legislative committees. For these reasons, they tend to focus on legal aid for 
their members. These associations, with the approval of the party and government and their 
encouragement to use the law, have helped their members protect and advance their 
legitimate rights and interests by use of law. To sum up, using the law as a weapon has 
become an important and effective mode of action for social organizations, regardless of the 
first and second categories. And the main driving force making this possible is the LDC. 
 
 
6. SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE LAW DISSEMINATION 
CAMPAIGN 
 
The LDC has very critical limitations, and the most significant of which are: state 
initiative and the exclusion of civil society, and insufficient motivation for local- and basic-
level officials to promote the campaign. Due to these problems, the LDC has not radically 
changed the lack of rule of law in China. 
 
6.1 State Initiative and the Exclusion of Civil Society 
 
The Party Center and State Council have continued to take the initiative in planning and 
executing the LDC. In localities, local party branches and governments have played a key 
role in implementing the campaign. The campaign is thus a top-down movement driven by 
the state. It is appropriate for the state to take the initiative, given that traditional conceptions 
of the law and legal nihilism are still strong in China. But the state is both one of the main 
targets that the LDC intends to reform and also the main agent promoting the campaign. The 
state should thus be the main implementer of the LDC, but it should also be supervised and 
pressured to transform by other forces: that is, civil society. 
Experience suggests that there are other ways and methods for popularizing the law and 
affecting the legal awareness and consciousness of people. For example, some rights-
protecting lawyers (weiquan lüshi) have launched lawsuits against government agencies and 
received prominent media coverage; in the process of adjudicating and reporting, legal 
knowledge education and propagation can take place widely and effectively. The Hepatitis-B 
lawsuits in 2002-03 were a case in point: about 40 job-seekers sued companies and state 
agencies because they were rejected on the grounds that they had contracted Hepatitis-B, and 
the media reported their cases. In the process, Chinese citizens had a chance to consider their 
basic rights prescribed in the Constitution and the reality of these rights being violated 




without any legal grounds (Kellogg, 2011: 340-379). 
However, the state has frequently oppressed the legal action of intellectuals and civil 
associations, by which they protect public rights and interests and change related laws and 
regulations. The suppression of rights-protecting lawyers is a case in point. A few examples 
might suffice. For one, the state suppressed and forcibly stopped the work of defense lawyers 
who prepared a class action against the government in 2008 on behalf of parents who had 
lost children due to the shoddy and faulty construction of schools in the Wenchuan 
earthquake; for another, lawyers who launched a class action in 2009 against the makers of 
products that were found to have killed hundreds of babies by toxic formula; and for still 
another, lawyers who defended the rights of victims of enforced demolition in urban areas. 
Some lawyers and law firms which had not succumbed to state oppression had their licences 
revoked (Amnesty, 2011). 
In a similar vein, civil associations that provide legal aid to Chinese workers, farmers and 
migrants have occasionally provoked party and government agencies and have been 
suppressed. March 25, 2010, for example, the Ministry of Education closed down the Center 
for Women’s Legal Research and Service (Funü falü yanjiu yu fuwu zhongxin) located in the 
Law School of Peking University, along with three other institutions in the school. A lawyer 
who was trained in Peking University, Guo Jianmei, established the Center in 1995 as 
China’s first civil organization for legal aid. The Center, called “the first NGO in China,” 
had 11 full-time lawyers, numerous part-time lawyers and five full-time staffers. Notably, the 
Center established a “cooperative network for Chinese legal aid” in 2000, in which about 100 
lawyers from 28 provinces took part, and took the initiative of civil associations’ legal aid 
activities. 
Two reasons were reportedly given for the closure of the Center. First, the Center 
received financial support from international NGOs. Second, the Center participated in 
sensitive legal cases and initiated the establishment of a national legal aid network. In short, 
the Center was closed because it was “politically very dangerous.” If state oppression of 
civic associations which help the social weak by using the law continues, the LDC will 
remain a limited movement led by the state alone. 
 
6.2 Local Cadres’ Lack of Motivations to Implement the Campaign 
 
A huge regional disparity has appeared in the evolution of the LDC. Most serious has 
been the disparity between urban and rural areas: that is, the campaign has not been properly 
implemented in the countryside. The most critical reason is that the campaign is contrary to 
the interests of local- and basic-level cadres, and they are reluctant to pursue it. 
First, the campaign aims to increase the legal awareness and consciousness of farmers. 
As their legal knowledge and consciousness increases, peasants use the law to raise questions 
and complain about illegalities or evasion of the law by cadres. In addition, along with the 
wide implementation of governance according to the law at the local and basic levels, cadres 
are afraid that the law may constrain their authority and actions. Viewed from the perspective 
of these cadres, because they have to follow the orders and instructions of higher 
governments through every means, both the aims and consequences of the campaign 
squarely collide with their interests. In this way, cadres have motivations not to support the 
campaign and to oppose it. At best, they carry out the campaign in a pro forma manner; at 
worst, they use every means, including physical force, to obstruct it. 
Most studies on the implementation of the campaign in rural areas, by both Chinese 
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government agencies and scholars, confirm this fact. For example, one study on the 
campaign in Fujian Province in 2002 found that many basic-level cadres thought that if they 
implemented the campaign too rigorously, farmers’ legal knowledge would increase, and it 
would be difficult to control farmers and accomplish government work. They strongly 
resisted the campaign because they thought it would deprive them of power. For this reason, 
they did not seriously pursue the campaign, and they just pretended to comply when higher-
level agencies urged them to do so (Fujiansheng, 2002: 35-36). There were similar findings 
in Henan and Hunan provinces (Henansheng, 2002: 24-25; Chen and Xiao, 2008: 77-79). 
Other studies also confirm these regional disparities, especially the poor implementation 
of the campaign in rural areas. For example, according to a survey of rural counties in 
Yunnan Province in 2003, about 25 percent of respondents said they had never heard of the 
LDC and about 75 percent said they had heard of it but never received any legal knowledge 
education. In fact, 95 percent of respondents had never received legal knowledge education 
(Zhao and Sun, 2004: 53-57). By way of reference, as of 2003, the campaign had already 
been in operation for 18 years. Other research findings on popular protests in rural areas 
strongly indicate that local governments and cadres tend to obstruct the spread of legal 






When the CCP launched the reform and opening-up policy, it needed to establish a 
workable legal system and to maintain public order especially in the rural area. China 
decided to launch the LDC in 1985 as measure to deal with these problems. The campaign 
has been seriously implemented for “core” target groups, such as the legal education for 
higher government officials and party cadres. The campaign has demonstrated both 
achievements and shortfalls. The most notable gains include establishing legal-aid systems 
and encouraging the ordinary citizens to engage legal actions to protect their legitimate rights 
and interests. At the same time, the campaign illustrates serious problems such as state 
initiative and the exclusion of civil society, and insufficient motivation for local- and basic-
level officials to promote the campaign. Due to these problems, the campaign has not 
dramatically changed the lack of rule of law in China.  
The above illustrates that the Chinese state has taken the initiative in developing a legal 
system and the rule of law policy as well as the economy in the reform era. According to the 
plans, the LDC started as a kind of legal enlightenment campaign with two purposes: one 
was disseminating necessary legal knowledge to society, the other encouraging law-abiding 
practices of government officials and party cadres. Later in the process of campaign 
implementation, it gradually developed beyond legal enlightenment campaign. The decision 
of rule of law policy as a ruling principle at the 15th Party Congress in 1997 and at the 
Fourth Plenum of 18th Central Committee of the CCP in 2014 was a culmination of this 
development. In other words, the campaign provided the CCP with valuable experiences and 
confidence on which the Party decided the rule of law as a guiding principle of government. 
All in all, the rule of law policy has penetrated into all the Party and state reforms, including 
administrative (i.e., administration according to the law), judicial (judicial justice and 
fairness), and party reforms (ruling the country according to the law) (Cho, 2014: 21-36). It 
thus remains to be seen to what extent the CCP can actually realize it and change the 




operation of Chinese political system as a result.  
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